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 A B S T R A C T  
This study seeks to investigate the differences in firm managers’ preferences in the 
use of internal funding to meet working capital needs. The data to be analyzed are 
obtained from the results of the World Bank's Productivity and the Investment 
Climate Survey on firm managers in 98 developing countries, with a total sample of 
1,235 firm managers. The analysis techniques used are linear regression and ordinal 
logit analysis. This study demonstrates the gender-based differences in the proportion 
of the use of internal funding sources. Female top managers prefer to use internal 
funding sources for working capital better than top male managers. This study not 
only provides a better understanding of the relationship between the existence of top 
female managers and the preference in the use of internally financed working capital 
but also informs firms that aim to balance the liquidity and the capital cost efficiency 
in managing their working capital to provide a more significant opportunity for 
women to occupy top management positions. 
 
 A B S T R A K  
Studi ini bertujuan untuk menyelidiki perbedaan preferensi manajer perusahaan 
berkenaan dengan penggunaan pendanaan internal untuk pemenuhan kebutuhan 
modal kerja. Data untuk kepentingan analisis diperoleh hasil World Bank’s 
Productivity and the Investment Climate Survey terhadap manajer perusahaan di 98 
negara berkembangan. Adapun jumlah sampel yang digunakan adalah sebanyak 1.235 
manajer perusahaan.  Data dianalisis menggunanakan regresi liner dan ordinal logit 
analisis. Hasil studi ini menunjukkan bahwa terdapat perbedaan proporsi penggunaan 
pendanaan internal berdasarkan gender. Top manajer puncak perempuan memiliki 
prefensi untuk memilih proporsi pendanaan internal untuk modal kerja lebih tinggi 
dibandingkan top manajer laki-laki. Studi ini bukan hanya dapat memberikan 
pemahaman yang lebih baik tentang keterkaitan antara keberadaan manajer puncak 
perempuan dengan preferensi penggunaan sumber pendanaan internal untuk 
kepentingan modal kerja tetapi juga memiliki implikasi praktis bagi perusahaan bahwa 
jika perusahan ingin mendapatkan keseimbangan antara likuditas dan efisiensi dalam 
pengelolaan modal kerja maka dapat memberikan peluang yang lebih besar kepada 




Working capital management determines the levels 
of firms' current assets and liabilities. These policies 
are equally important to other financial policies such 
as financing, investment, and dividend policies. 
Furthermore, working capital policies involve not 
only firms' internal stakeholders but also external 
ones such as customers and suppliers. Effective 
working capital policies are crucial because of their 
role in ensuring firms' daily operating activities 
(Adamu & Hussaini, 2015; Marobhe, 2015) and their 
long-term viability (Rasyid et al., 2018). Thus, 
inappropriate working capital policies will likely 
lead to business failure (Smith, 1973).  
There are two orientations of working capital 
policies: aggressive and conservative (Brigham & 
Houston, 2012). The selection of policy orientations 
is complicated because it involves a trade-off 
between liquidity and efficiency concerns. A 
working capital policy is said to be optimal if there 
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is a balance between risk and efficiency. However, 
especially in developed countries, firms prioritize 
liquidity risk aversion in their working capital 
policies. For example, a report from Ernst and 
Young inform that in 2018 about 1,500 leading US 
and European firms had excessive working capital 
of US $ 2.5 trillion above the required amounts for 
their business operations and operating cash. This 
figure is significant because it was equal to almost 
10% of these firms' sales.   
The choice of working capital policy is closely 
related to managers' characteristics as decision-
makers, including gender. The main reason for this 
argument is that women tend to behave differently 
than men in making strategic analyses and decisions 
(Bear et al., 2010; Alonso-Almeida & Bremser, 2015). 
Thus, gender is likely associated with working 
capital management.  
Numerous studies have investigated gender-
based financial policy choices. For example, several 
studies have analyzed investment decisions (Bogan 
& Just, 2013; Levi et al., 2014; Liang at al., 2018; Lutfi, 
2011; Palupi & Santoso, 2017), financing decisions 
(Huang & Kisgen, 2013; Faccio et al., 2016), and 
dividend decisions (Al-amarneh et al., 2017). In 
general, these studies find that top female managers 
tend to make less risky financing and investment 
decisions than top male managers. In a similar vein, 
top female managers exhibit higher dividend 
payout than firms led by top male managers because 
dividends are considered less risky than capital 
gain. However, to our best knowledge, gender-
based working capital policy choices are still 
relatively understudied. For example, Nastiti et al. 
(2019) empirically find that female managers of 
Indonesian manufacturing firms tend to make 
conservative working capital policies. In this 
respect, top female managers tend to prefer their 
firms to have a higher proportion of their assets in 
current assets to minimize liquidity risk. However, 
it is likely that firms also focus on efficiency when 
they put greater reliance on internal sources to 
finance their working capital needs, because internal 
financing sources, especially from retained earnings, 
have the lowest cost of capital than other financing 
sources. Nastiti et al. (2019) do not investigate 
further the role of gender in the selection of internal 
financing sources for working capital management.  
This study seeks to investigate gender-based 
preference differences in the use of internal 
financing sources for working capital. This study 
also responds to Kilic & Kuzey (2016) call for further 
research on the effect of women representation in 
top management because this issue is relatively 
understudied. Besides, from a practical point of 
view, this study illustrates the economic benefits of 
women representation in top management to ensure 
the sustainability of the firm. 
 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HY-
POTHESES 
Pecking Order Theory 
As proposed by Myres & Majluf (1984), the pecking 
order theory is based on Donaldson’s hypothesis in 
1961 as one of the most well-known theories on 
firms’ capital structure. The theory illustrates the 
order of firms’ financing source choices. Managers 
prefer internal financing to external financing. If 
internal financing is insufficient, they prefer to using 
safer debts to risky debts. Moreover, finally, if debt 
financing is insufficient, stock issuance is the last 
alternative of financing sources. Two underlying 
rationalities explain the order of financing source 
preference, namely (1) the presence of transaction 
costs of external financing and (2) information 
asymmetry (Vasiliou et al., 2009). Internal financing 
does not incur transaction costs, while debt-based 
external financing is less costly than stock issuance. 
Further, information asymmetry between firms and 
potential investors implies that investors tend to buy 
discounted stocks from firms, causing new stocks as 
a financing source to become costly.  
Several studies have provided different 
empirical evidence on the pecking order theory. 
Starting from Shyam-Sunder & Myers (1999), who 
empirically support pecking order theory, with 
follow-up studies in different contexts, also find 
similar results (Hsu at al., 2013; Febriana & Yulianto, 
2017; Jarallah et al., 2019). However,  Frank & Goyal 
(2009), Culata & Gunarsih (2012), and Nguyen et al. 
(2019) do not support pecking order theory. Despite 
inconclusive findings on the order of financing 
preferences, the pecking order theory is likely 
relevant in explaining working capital management.  
 
Working Capital Policies and Gender 
Both aggressive and conservative working capital 
policies will create a trade-off between liquidity and 
efficiency.  For example, firms that opt for 
conservative current assets investment decisions 
will reduce liquidity risk while also their operational 
efficiency because they incur higher opportunity 
cost and cost of capital that will negatively affect 
their profits. Similarly, conservative financing 
policies motivate firms to rely more on long-term 
debts with relatively higher capital costs than short-
term debts. According to the pecking order theory, 
firms should be able to mitigate the trade-off 
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between liquidity and efficiency. More specifically, 
firms can have higher internally financed working 
capital that leads to lower cost of capital. Thus, on 
the one hand, they can reduce liquidity risk or 
inability to fulfill short-term liabilities. On the other 
hand, they can avoid inefficient operation due to 
higher working capital investment that negatively 
affects firms' overall financial performance.   
The choice of internal financing to meet 
working capital needs is likely related to the gender 
of the firms' decision-makers. Several studies find 
that female managers' presence causes firms to 
exhibit better corporate governance, such as more 
extensive public disclosure and greater willingness 
to join oversight committees (Adams & Ferreira, 
2009; Vähämaa, 2017; DeBoskey et al., 2018). Thus, it 
is understandable that Kang et al. (2010)  find 
investors' positive reactions to female directors' 
appointments. Based on these findings, female 
managers' presence is likely to reduce information 
asymmetry that firms will manage to acquire 
external financing at relatively lower costs. Thus, 
firms with female managers will be motivated to 
increase the proportion of external financing for 
their working capital needs.  
However, it is also likely that female managers 
use a higher proportion of internal financing sources 
because of two arguments. First, closely related to 
risk preference, numerous studies show that female 
managers are more likely to avoid risks than male 
managers (Adams & Funk, 2012; Faccio et al., 2016; 
Yu et al., 2017). Internal financing is both less costly 
and less risky for firms. Meanwhile, external 
financing (including debts) likely causes firms to 
incur interest costs and face liquidity risk that will 
potentially lead to bankruptcy. Consequently, 
female managers who tend to avoid risks will seek 
to prioritize internal financing. Second, several 
studies demonstrate that women are less likely to 
exhibit overconfidence than men (e.g., Barber & 
Odean, 2001; Huang & Kisgen, 2013).  Female 
managers who are less confident tend to 
underestimate their own abilities and overestimate 
risks and uncertainty (Odean, 1998; Pompian, 2012; 
Dittrich et al., 2014). Consequently, they are likely to 
finance their firms' operations or fulfill their firms' 
working capital requirements by prioritizing 
internal financing.  
Based on the arguments above, the hypothesis 
proposed is as follows: 
 
H1: Female top managers will choose a higher 
proportion of internally financed working 
capital than top male managers. 
 
3. RESEARCH METHOD 
This study used the World Bank’s Productivity and 
the Investment Climate Survey on firm managers in 
98 developing countries in 2006-2018. Considering 
the consistency of the answers and the completeness 
of the data for analysis, 1,235 companies were then 
selected as the final sample.  
 
Table 1. Variable Measurement. 
Variable Measurement 
Top manager’s gender A dummy variable equals 1 if the top manager is female, 0 otherwise 
Top manager's experience Top manager’s years of  working experience in the same industry with the industry in which her/ his current firm operates 
Firm age Firm’s age in 2018 
Firm size 
A categorical variable (4 categories): 1 if the firm is a micro firm with less than 
five employees, 2 if the firm is a small firm with 6-19 employees, 3 if the firm 
is a medium-firm with 20-99 employees, and 4 if the firm is a large firm with 
more than 100 employees.  
Industry type 
Classified into three measures, namely 1 if the firm belongs to the 
manufacturing industry, 2 if the firm belongs to the retail industry, and 3 if 
the firm belongs to the service industry. 
Debt A dummy variable equals 1 if the firm has debts from banks, 0 otherwise. 
 
The dependent variable of this study was 
internal financing measured by using the question in 
the survey on "the proportion of working capital 
financed by the internal fund (%)." Meanwhile, the 
independent variable was the top manager's gender 
that was measured with the dummy variable. 
Because financing decisions are affected by 
numerous factors, the following factors were 
included as the control variables: manager's 
experience, firm's age, firm's size, industry type, and 




Consistent with our research objective, this 
study used the following regression equation:  
 
IFWCit =  a+b1GENit + b2EXPit + b3SIZEit + b4AGEit + 
b5INDit + b6DEBTit + eit               (1) 
 
Where IFWC is Internally financed working capital, 
GEN is Top manager’s gender, EXP is Top 
manager’s experience, SIZE is Firm’s size, AGE is 
Firm’s age, DEBT is Debt, and IND is Industry type. 
 
4. DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A of Table 2 shows that the proportion of 
internally financed working capital is 55.19 percent. 
AGE varies quite widely since some firms are newly 
operated, but a firm has operated for 114 years. The 
average firm’s age is 25.97 years. On average, 
managers work in the same industry for 22.18 years, 
although the maximum value of this variable is 64 
years. Crosstab is used to provide more detailed 
information on the categorical variables.  
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A. Descriptive Anal 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev. 
Working Capital internal 0.00 100.00 55.19 28.41 
Firm age 6.00 114.00 25.97 15.94 
Experience 0.00 64.00 22.18 11.79 












Top Manager’s Gender     
      Female 9 (7.69) 20 (17.09) 88 (75.21) 117.00 
      Male 306 (27.37) 412 (36.85) 400 (35.78) 1.118.00 
Firm Size     
      Small 147 (25.83) 198 (34.80) 224 (39.37) 569.00 
      Medium 109 (23.96) 150 (32.97) 196 (43.08) 455.00 
      Large  59 (27.96) 84 (39.81) 68 (32.23) 211.00 
Industry     
     Manufacturing 73 (21.10) 128 (36.99) 145 (41.92) 346.00 
     Retail 154 (25.62) 217 (36.11) 230 (38.27) 601.00 
     Service 88 (30.56) 87 (30.21) 113 (39.24) 288.00 
Having Debts from 
Banks?     
     No 120 (20.76) 176 (30.45) 282 (48.79) 578.00 
     Yes 195 (29.68) 256 (38.96) 206 (31.35) 657.00 
 
Panel B Tabel 2 illustrates that, based on gender, 
there are fewer female top managers than male 
managers. Further, most female managers choose to 
use a higher proportion of internally financed 
working capital. However, only 35.78 percent of male 
managers choose a higher proportion of internally 
financed working capital. In this respect, 36.85 
percent of male managers choose a moderate (low) 
proportion of internally financed working capital. 
Regarding firm size, small and medium firms 
dominate and tend to use greater internally financed 
working capital (39.37 percent and 43.77 percent). In 
comparison, large firms tend to rely on moderate, 
internally financed working capital (39.81 percent). 
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From the industry type, firms in manufacturing, 
retail, and service industries tend to use high 
internally financed working capital. On the other 
side, firms that do not have debts from banks tend to 
use high internally financed working capital (48.90 
percent). In comparison, firms with debts from banks 
tend to use moderate internal financing for their 
working capital requirements (38.96 percent). Next, 
the correlation matrix describes the relationship 
between all research variables. 
 
Table 3. Correlation Matrix 




Correlation 1 0.3212 -0.0774
** -0.0314 -0.0023 -0.0180 -0.1749 
Sig. (2-tailed)  0.0000**  0.0061**  0.2840  0.9333  0.5333  0.0000** 
Gender (2) 
Pearson  
Correlation  1 -0.0679 -0.0901 -0.0433 -0.0600 -0.0683 
Sig. (2-tailed)    0.0172*  0.0020**  0.1348  0.0361*  0.0171* 
Industry (3) 
Pearson  
Correlation    1 -0.0089  0.0421  0.0080  0.0060 
Sig. (2-tailed)     0.7550  0.1441  0.7731  0.8200 
Firm Size (4) 
Pearson  
Correlation     1  0.2443  0.1277  0.2383 
Sig. (2-tailed)      0.0000**  0.0000**  0.0000** 
Firm Age (5) 
Pearson  
Correlation     1  0.4461  0.2532 
Sig. (2-tailed)       0.0000**  0.0000** 
Experience (6) 
Pearson  
Correlation       1  0.2200 
Sig. (2-tailed)        0.0000** 
Debt (7) 
Pearson  
Correlation        1 
Sig. (2-tailed)        
Notes: ** correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed) and * correlation is significant at the 0.05 level 
(two-tailed) 
 
Table 3 indicates the correlation between gender 
and internally financed working capital.  For the 
control variables, only industry type and bank debt 
are correlated with internally financed working 
capital. In contrast, other control variables, such as 
firm age, firm size, and manager’s experience, are not 
correlated with internally financed working capital.  
  
Hypothesis Testing 
Table 4 shows the adjusted R2 value of 0.1290, that 
suggests that the independent variable explains 
12.9% of the change of internally financed working 
capital. The significance value of the F-test of 0.0000 
implies that the research model is acceptable. 
Specifically, the manager's gender, firm size, firm age, 
manager’s experience, industry type, and debt 
simultaneously affect internally financed working 
capital. 
Partially, Table 4 above demonstrates that the 
manager's gender significantly affects internally 
financed working capital (b= 0.3111; a=0.0000). Thus, 
top female managers will choose a higher proportion 
of internally financed working capital, implying that 
H1 is supported. The results support the arguments 
of Adams & Funk (2012), Faccio et al., (2016) and Yu 
et al., (2017) that women tend to avoid risks and 
female managers choose internal financing that is not 
only less costly but also less risky for firms than 
external financing. Besides, these findings also 
confirm the results of research from Barber & Odean 
(2001) and Huang & Kisgen (2013) that women are 
less confident than men, so those female managers 
will prioritize internal financing sources to meet their 
firms' working capital requirements.  
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Table 4. Regression Results 
  Coefficient t Sig. 
 
Gender  0.3111 11.5998 0.0000 
Size  0.0259 0.9150 0.3600 
Age  0.0431 1.4151 0.1570 
Experience  0.0171 0.5662 0.5721 
Industry -0.0568 -2.1367 0.0333 
Debt -0.1741 -6.1771 0.0000 
 R Adjusted R2 F Sig 
 0.3651 0.1290 31.5200 0.0000 
 
The control variables' tests indicate that industry 
type and bank debt have a significant impact on 
internally financed working capital. In contrast, firm 
size, firm age, and manager’s experience do not affect 
internally financed working capital.  
 
Ordinal logit test is used to ensure the robustness 
of the findings. More specifically, the dependent 
variable is classified into three categories, namely low 
internally financed working capital, moderate 
internally financed working capital, and high 
internally financed working capital. 
 
Tabel 5. Ordinal Logit Test 
Effect Model Fitting Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
 -2 Log Likelihood of  Reduced Model Chi-Square Df Sig. 
Intercept 2143.4080 0.0000 0  
Gender 2211.6080 68.2000 2 0.0000 
Industri 2151.3360 7.9280 4 0.0940 
Size 2155.3200 11.9120 4 0.0180 
Age 2324.3080 180.9000 164 0.1740 
Experience 2281.9590 13.5510 116 0.0750 
Debt 2183.0020 39.5950 2 0.0000 
Pseudo R-square;  Chi-Square Df Sig. 
Cox and Snell 0.3050    
Nagelkerke 0.3450 449.4180 292 0.0000 
McFadden 0.1680    
 
The results of the ordinal logit test in Table 5 
show that the pseudo-R2 Cox and Snell = 0.3050 
suggest that the proportion of variance for internally 
financed working capital explained by the predictor 
variable is 30.5%. Meanwhile, χ2 = 68.2000 with α = 
0.0000. Thus, supporting the previous arguments 
gives the reason that top female managers will choose 
a greater proportion of internally financed working 
capital. 
 
5. CONCLUSION, IMPLICATION, SUGGES-
TION, AND LIMITATIONS 
This study tests the role of top managers’ gender in 
relying on internal financing sources for working 
capital requirements by analyzing 1.235 firm 
managers in 98 developing countries from the 
World Bank’s Productivity and the Investment 
Climate Survey. Based on the cross-country data, 
this study demonstrates a gender-based difference 
in the proportion of the use of internal financing 
sources. In particular, top female managers tend to 
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choose a higher proportion of internally financed 
working capital than top male managers.   
Our results offer both academic and practical 
contributions. Specifically, this study provides a 
better understanding of the association between top 
female managers and the preferred order of 
financing sources, especially for the working capital 
purpose, which is relatively understudied.  The 
findings also confirm the pecking order theory 
proposed by Myers & Majluf (1984) and the 
arguments that female managers tend to be risk-
averse (Adams & Funk. 2012; Yu et al. 2017) and less 
confident (Barber & Odean, 2001; Huang & Kisgen. 
2013). From a practical point of view, this study 
suggests that companies in developing countries 
seek to balance liquidity and capital cost efficiency 
in working capital management to provide more 
significant opportunities for women to occupy top 
managerial positions. 
The sample used in this study is potentially 
biased because there is no identification of whether 
firm managers are also firm owners. However, the 
interaction between the manager's gender and firm 
ownership status may also result in different 
preferences in the order of the use of financing 
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